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NOTE AND COMMENT
DIsQuALIFIcATioN 012 JUDGZS BY PRrjuDIcm.-Under the provisions 'of
Section 21 of the Federal Judicial Code, Victor Berger and others, who had
been indicted under the Espionage Act in the Northern District of Illinois,
filed an affidavit charging Judge Landis with personal bias and prejudice
against them as German-Americans, and moved for the assignment of another
judge to preside at Iheir trial. The motion was overruled by Judge Landis,
and he himself presided at the trial, and the defendants were convicted and
sentenced. The Supreme Court of the United States, to which the matter
came on certificate, held, three justices dissenting, that Judge Landis could
not, under the statute, pass upon the truth of the facts alleged in the affidavit
showing prejudice, but that, upon the filing of an affidavit sufficient on its
face, he was incapacitated from further proceeding with the case. Berger v.
United States, No. 46o, decided January 31, I921.
This decision seems in harmony with the evident purpose of the statute,
and is reassuring to all who feel that the courts cannot too strictly guard
themselves from any suspicion of hostility or favoritism toward litigants.
The common law was probably too indifferent on this matter. Blackstone
says that "in the times of Bracton and Fleta, a judge might be refused for
good cause; but now the law is otherwise, and it is held that judges and
justices cannot be challanged." 3 COMMBNTARMs, 362. But the obviously
just rule that a man cannot be judge in his own case, now universally recog-
nized, would seem to extend itself in principle over every suit where a judge,
by reason of prejudice and the consequent partisan interest which he devel-
ops, has made himself morally a party to the action. The section of the
Federal Judicial Code on which the objection to Judge Landis was based
undertook to put this principle into operation. Upon the filing of the affidavit
Judge Landis undoubtedly became a party to a controversy over his own fit-
ness, and he insisted on deciding the merits of the case in which he was a
contestant. The Supreme Court thought him qualified to decide the legal
sufficiency of the showing made, but not to pass upon the truth of the accu-
sation.
Under a somewhat similar statute in Montana it has been held that the
filing of a proper disqualification affidavit ipso facto deprives the judge of
further authority to act. State ex rel. v. Clancy, 3o Mont. 529; State ex rel.
v. Donlan, 32 Mont 256. Under the California statute a similar result fol-
lows in justice court cases, People v. Flagley, 22 Cal. 34, and in superior
court cases where no counter affidavits are filed, People v. Compton, 123 Cal.
2TLAw As TO BoYcorr, WYMAN (1903), is Green Bag, 2o8-215.
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403. The "salutary rule" of relieving the judge from the "very delicate and
trying duty of deciding upon the question of his own disqualification" received
,the warm approval of the California court in the case last cited.
The Berger case effectually disaffirms the doctrine of Ex parte N. K.
Fairbanks Co., 194 Fed. 978, where Judge Jones, in the Middle District of
Alabama, held, in a long and elaborate opinion, that Congress could not,
under the Constitution, "lawfully enact that a judge, who is in truth qualified,
is in law disqualified because a suitor makes an affidavit to that effect, and
make that ex parte statement conclusive proof of the disqualification and cut
off all judicial inquiry as to the judge's competency." He contended that
the disqualification of a judge to try a particular case must rest upon facts
which unfit him, and the existence of such facts must be determined as a
judicial question by some judicial tribunal; that if the filing of the requisite
affidavit operated to prevent the judge from further acting in the litigation
we should have a situation where "the affidavit maker in fact, though not in
name, puts on the judicial robes and excludes the presiding judge and all
other judicial authority from any voice in determining the -matter, and by
the mare filing of an affidavit renders judgment of disqualification and exe-
cutes it," citing Mabry v. Baxter, Ix Heisk. (Tenn.) 689, 691, and Sanders v.
Cabanniss, 43 Ala. 173, in condemnation of such a procedure as an illegal
assumption by the legislature of judicial power.
Although two dissenting opinioils were filed in the Berger case, written
by Justices Day and McReynolds, neither of them suggests that the con-
struction of the statute given by the majority of the court involves any uncon-
stitutional interference with the judicial power vested in the courts.
E. R. S.
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